Global imbalances: the international monetary system and financial stability. by Carney, M.
Global imbalances and ﬁ  nancial stability
Banque de France ￿ Financial Stability Review ￿ No. 15 ￿ February 2011  31
Global imbalances:
the international monetary system 




Understanding the link between global macroeconomic imbalances and ﬁ  nancial stability is critical not 
only for understanding the recent ﬁ  nancial crisis, but also for what could happen next. The imbalances 
and ﬁ  nancial vulnerabilities that plagued the global economy before the crisis have begun to re-emerge. 
In a context of deﬁ  cient global demand and exceptionally low interest rates in many countries, one likely 
result is excessively risky behaviour in the ﬁ  nancial sector. A failure to resolve global disequilibria will 
ultimately undermine the global recovery and ﬁ  nancial stability. Several lines of defence against this 
outcome are needed, including greater responsibility on the part of households, ﬁ  rms and governments 
to manage their debts, and enhanced ﬁ  nancial sector supervision.
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W
hile there were many causes of the 
ﬁ  nancial crisis, its intensity and scope 
reﬂ  ected the build-up of unprecedented 
global disequilibria. For a time, large current 
account imbalances fostered low real interest rates, 
subdued macroeconomic volatility and widespread 
complacency amongst market participants. A stable 
macroeconomic environment and liquid markets 
were taken for granted, prompting a search for 
yield, rising leverage, and dramatic under-pricing of 
risks. With the international monetary system (IMS) 
failing to promote timely and orderly adjustment, 
when it came, the reckoning was brutal. While 
many, including the Bank of Canada persistently 
warned about the dangers of global imbalances 
in the run-up to the crisis, few identiﬁ  ed the link 
between them and ﬁ  nancial stability.
Understanding the link between global 
macroeconomic imbalances and ﬁ  nancial stability 
is critical not only for our understanding of what 
has occurred, but also for what could happen next. 
The imbalances and vulnerabilities that plagued 
the global economy before the crisis have begun to 
re-emerge. Given the shortcomings of the current IMS 
and the ongoing strains in the global ﬁ  nancial system, 
these imbalances pose renewed risks to strong and 
sustainable global growth.
To better understand these risks, this article ﬁ  rst 
explores some of the sources of global imbalances 
in the lead-up to the crisis and examines how they 
contributed to ﬁ  nancial instability. It then describes 
how the re-emergence of global imbalances is creating 
new risks to the global ﬁ  nancial system. In light of 
these risks, the conclusion is self-evident: a failure to 
resolve global disequilibria will ultimately undermine 
the global recovery.
1| GLOBAL IMBALANCES 
AND FINANCIAL STABILITY 
PRIOR TO THE CRISIS
The largest peacetime current account imbalances 
since the beginning of the 20th century reﬂ  ected 
a combination of structural changes and 
policy choices. 
1|1 Structural  changes
Two main structural changes drove the re-emergence 
of global imbalances during the past two decades. First, 
the integration of China, India and other emerging 
market economies (EMEs) represented a historically 
unprecedented, and fundamentally positive, 
structural shift in the global economy (Chart 1). Never 
in history has economic integration involved so many 
people, both in raw numbers and as a percentage 
of the global population. For example, when North 
America and the periphery of Europe were integrated 
during the latter half of the 19th century, their total 
population was half the size of the then-advanced 
countries. The comparable ratio for postwar Japan 
was 10 per cent. Contrast that with China and India 
today, which alone represent 2.5 times the current 
population of advanced countries. Adjusted for the 
percentage of the population in the traded-goods 
sector, the effective global labour supply quadrupled 
between 1980 and 2005, with most of the increase 
taking place after 1990. This trend is set to continue: 
the globally integrated labour force is projected to 
double again by 2050 (Carney, 2008). 
Second, the global economy has opened dramatically 
–merchandise exports now make up about 20 per cent 
of global GDP, compared with about 9 per cent at 
the height of the last great wave of globalisation. 
Cross-border capital ﬂ  ows are now roughly 15 per cent 
Chart 1
Increase in share of world GDP during peak growth 
periods: United States and EMEs
(%)
United States
China, India, Brazil, Mexico, Indonesia 
and South Korea
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of global GDP, compared with 3 per cent at the turn 
of the last century (Carney, 2008).1 Since the 1980s, 
capital ﬂ  ows among and between advanced and 
emerging market economies have exploded, leading 
to large build-ups in cross-border claims (Chart 2). 
This deeper ﬁ  nancial integration has meant that 
shocks, both real and ﬁ  nancial, are now transmitted 
quickly across ﬁ  nancial markets. 
History shows that international systems dominated 
by ﬁ  xed and/or managed exchange rates seldom cope 
well with major structural changes. This failure is 
the result of two pervasive problems: the downward 
rigidity of nominal prices and wages and an 
asymmetric adjustment process. In the short run, it 
is generally much less costly, economically as well 
as politically, for countries with balance of payments 
surpluses to maintain them and accumulate reserves 
than it is for deﬁ  cit countries to sustain deﬁ  cits. 
Countries with deﬁ  cits must either run down their 
reserves or deﬂ  ate their currencies. The only limit 
on reserve accumulation for surplus countries is its 
ultimate impact on domestic prices. 
Depending on the openness of the ﬁ  nancial system and 
the degree of sterilisation, this impact can be delayed 
for a very long time (Carney, 2010a).2 In such an 
environment, great risks to ﬁ  nancial stability can build.
Not surprisingly, the current hybrid IMS, with its 
mix of ﬁ  xed and ﬂ  oating exchange rates, has been 
unable to facilitate the required adjustment between 
surplus and deﬁ  cit countries. 
1|2 Policy  choices
This reﬂ  ects policy choices of both emerging market 
and advanced economies. Many EMEs pursued 
exchange rate policies that effectively thwarted real 
exchange rate adjustment. Indeed, given the scale 
of the economic miracle, it is remarkable that the 
currencies of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, China) 
have only appreciated 5 per cent in real terms against 
the G7 over the past decade (Chart 3). EMEs have 
accumulated massive foreign reserves, concentrated 
both in terms of holder (the top ﬁ  ve countries hold 
roughly 50 per cent) and currency (two-thirds are 
in US dollars). 
Maintaining undervalued exchange rates requires 
capital controls and sterilised intervention, both 
of which are less than fully effective over time. 
Financial repression maximises the efficacy of 
sterilisation but at great cost. With the access of ﬁ  rms 
and households to credit limited as a consequence 
of sterilisation, structural forces fostering high 
savings rates were reinforced. The end result has 
1  Remarks by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada: "The implications of globalisation for the economy and public policy", presented to the British Columbia 
Chamber of Commerce and the Business Council of British Columbia, 18 February 2008. http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/speeches/2008/sp08-2.html.
2  Remarks by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada: "Restoring faith in the international monetary system", Spruce Meadows changing fortunes round 
table, 10 September 2010. http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/speeches/2010/sp100910.html.
Chart 2
Gross foreign assets and liabilities
(% of GDP)










Source: Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007).
Chart 3
BRIC real effective exchange rate against the G7
(January 2000 = 100)






Sources: IMF, Bloomberg, National Statistics Agencies.
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been a “savings glut” in many emerging markets, 
particularly China since the early 2000s (Chart 4).
The combination of expansionary monetary and ﬁ  scal 
policies in advanced countries following the 2001 
recession and high savings rates in East Asia generated 
signiﬁ  cant global imbalances, massive capital ﬂ  ows, 
and the “conundrum” of very low, long-term interest 
rates. These low risk-free rates, in turn, fed the search 
for yield and excessive leverage across the system. 
The deregulation of housing and consumer ﬁ  nance 
reinforced a secular decline in private savings.
Vulnerabilities grew from this combination of macro 
imbalances and micro failings in risk management, 
supervision, and ﬁ  nancial regulation. Low, stable 
and predictable inflation and low variability 
in economic activity –especially when associated 
with exceptionally low and stable interest rates– bred 
complacency among ﬁ  nancial market participants as 
risk taking adapted to the perceived new equilibrium.3 
Policy-makers in advanced economies were too slow 
to recognise and address the looming risks. The overall 
result was a period of increasingly unbalanced 
growth, without the real and financial signals 
necessary to promote timely and orderly economic 
adjustment. Three years ago, the pressures became 
overwhelming. Financial systems in advanced 
economies seized up; virtually every ﬁ  nancial asset 
in the world was repriced; and private demand in 
advanced economies collapsed. 
The policy response to the crash has been an 
unprecedented easing of ﬁ  scal and monetary policy, 
which has bought time for the necessary adjustments. 
But a durable solution requires a rebalancing of global 
supply and demand. This will not happen without 
changes to the functioning of both the international 
monetary and ﬁ  nancial systems.
2| RE-EMERGING IMBALANCES 
AND RISKS TO FINANCIAL STABILITY
2|1  A hesitant recovery
Going forward, the recovery will depend critically on 
a rebalancing of global demand. This is no easy task, 
and will rely on the implementation by both advanced 
and emerging market economies of the suite of policy 
reforms as set out in the G20 Framework for Strong, 
Sustainable and Balanced Growth. These include:
• ﬁ  nancial sector reform and repair;
• ﬁ  scal consolidation, appropriately timed, where needed;
•  structural reforms to enhance economic growth;
•  more market-determined exchange rates. 
Progress is being made: ﬁ  nancial sector reforms, 
particularly new capital and liquidity rules (Basel III), 
have been agreed and are now being implemented. 
Fiscal consolidation has begun in many countries. 
However, progress on growth-enhancing structural 
reforms has been slower, and exchange rate 
adjustment is still being thwarted. 
Real exchange rate adjustment, in particular, will 
be critical for the rebalancing of global growth. 
Adjustments in real exchange rates would be most 
effectively achieved through movements in nominal 
exchange rates, allowing relative wages and prices to 
adjust quickly and symmetrically to restore external 
balance. 
Chart 4
China’s investment and savings
(% of GDP)










3  Indeed, risk appears to be at its greatest when measures of it are at their lowest. Low variability of inﬂ  ation and output reduces current ﬁ  nancial VaR and 
encourages greater risk taking (on a forward VaR basis), as investors stretch from liquid to less liquid markets. In parallel, low and stable interest rates promote 
larger asset-liability mismatches across credit and currency markets. These tendencies are particularly marked if there is perceived certainty about the stability 
of low interest rates.
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At present, the international monetary system 
is sliding towards a massive dollar block. Over a 
dozen countries are now accumulating reserves at 
double digit annual rates, and countries representing 
over 40 per cent of the US dollar trade weight are 
now managing their currencies. As a result, real 
exchange rate adjustment is more likely to occur 
through changes in general wages and prices. 
The implications for asset prices, output, employment, 
and thus ﬁ  nancial stability, could be considerable, 
as the absence of nominal adjustment will reinforce 
inﬂ  ationary pressures in those economies where 
exchange rates are signiﬁ  cantly undervalued, and 
disinﬂ  ationary pressures elsewhere (primarily in 
the advanced economies). 
INFLATIONARY PRESSURES IN EMERGING ECONOMIES
Already, inflationary pressures are rising in 
emerging economies (Chart 5). Despite divergent 
growth and inﬂ  ation prospects, many countries 
with ﬁ  xed exchange rates are effectively shadowing 
US monetary policy, which is not well suited to their 
circumstances (Chart 6). If this divergence in optimal 
monetary policy stance persists, the strains on the 
system will grow. 
DISINFLATIONARY PRESSURES IN ADVANCED ECONOMIES
In the major advanced economies, disinﬂ  ationary 
pressures are evident (Chart 5). These economies 
have a diminished ability to expand domestic 
demand, given the ﬁ  scal constraints and scale of 
balance-sheet repair that is necessary. Instead, 
demand must come from the external sector 
–as such, advanced countries’ international 
competitiveness needs to be rebuilt through 
changes to nominal exchange rates or, failing that, 
lower domestic wages and prices. The dynamic is 
perhaps most stark in peripheral Europe where 
the ﬁ  rst option is not available. The extent of these 
dis-inﬂ  ationary pressures is best exempliﬁ  ed by the 
fact that monetary policy remains at the effective 
lower bound in many jurisdictions, and additional 
unconventional measures have been introduced.
In this environment, the current frustration of 
adjustment by surplus countries is leading to deﬁ  cient 
global demand. This risks creating a similar dynamic 
to that being experienced in the Euro area, but on 
a global scale, with sustained weak growth in many 
countries. The absence of a rebalancing of global 
demand could have very large costs. The potential 
costs are huge –up to USD 7 trillion in lost global 
output by 2015 (Carney 2010a). Needless to say, the 
consequences for ﬁ  nancial stability would be profound.
2|2  Risks to ﬁ  nancial stability
The lack of a rebalancing of global growth and an 
environment of deﬁ  cient global demand could affect 
ﬁ  nancial stability through a variety of channels, 
including: the impact of slow economic growth 
on the ﬁ  nancial sector and ﬁ  scal sustainability, 
Chart 5





















Sources: National Statistics Agencies.
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Sources: US Federal Reserve, Bank of Canada.
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the consequences of sustained low interest rates 
for a broad range of ﬁ  nancial participants, and the 
de-stabilising impact of excess capital ﬂ  ows to EMEs.
SLOW RECOVERY, SOVEREIGN DEBT 
AND THE BANKING SECTOR
History suggests that recessions involving ﬁ  nancial 
crises tend to be deeper and have recoveries that take 
twice as long. In the decade following severe ﬁ  nancial 
crises, growth rates tend to be one percentage point 
lower and unemployment rates ﬁ  ve percentage 
points higher.4 The current US recovery is proving 
no exception, and in Europe we have estimated that 
the shortfall relative to pre-crisis trend growth could 
ultimately amount to 40 per cent of European GDP 
over the long-term (Carney, 2010b).5 This foregone 
output hits the ﬁ  nancial sector directly by reducing 
the speed with which banks can repair their balance 
sheets, keeping credit losses elevated, and muting 
other sources of revenue.
As has been painfully reinforced over the past several 
months, the problems of banking sector weakness 
and ﬁ  scal sustainability can become intertwined. 
Slower recoveries will place increased pressure on 
the ﬁ  scal positions of the advanced economies, and 
in some cases raise concerns about their capacity and 
willingness to support the ﬁ  nancial sector if needed. 
A re-pricing of sovereign risk could also compromise 
ﬁ  nancial stability by introducing market volatility and 
increasing bank funding costs. Moreover, ﬁ  nancial 
institutions and institutional investors are major 
holders of sovereign debt, leaving them exposed to 
turmoil in sovereign debt markets.
LOW FOR LONG INTEREST RATES
To respond to the deﬂ  ationary pressures emanating 
from global imbalances, advanced economies have 
maintained policy rates at extraordinarily low levels, 
and implemented unconventional measures to 
provide stimulative monetary conditions. Historically 
low policy rates, even if appropriate to achieve price 
stability, create their own risks. Aside from monetary 
4  See Reinhart and Reinhart: “After the fall,” Macroeconomic challenges: the decade ahead, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 2010 Economic Policy Symposium 
available at http://www.kansascityfed.org/publicat/sympos/2010/reinhart-paper.pdf.
  Recent work by the Basel Committee in the context of Basel III reviews the literature on the cost of ﬁ  nancial crises, and notes the enormous potential costs in terms 
of foregone GDP for both advanced and emerging economies alike. See “An assessment of the long-term impact of stronger capital and liquidity requirements” 
available at http://www.bis.org/pubi/bcbs173.pdf.
5  Remarks by Mark Carney, Governor of the Bank of Canada: "Bundesbank lecture 2010: The economic consequences of the reforms" Deutsche Bundesbank, 
14 September 2010. http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/speeches/2010/sp140910.html.
policy, authorities will need to remain as vigilant 
as they have been in the past to the possibility of 
ﬁ  nancial imbalances developing in an environment 
of still-low interest rates and relative price stability.
While such measures are essential in the current 
context, sustained low interest rates can create their 
own risks that could increase the challenges faced by 
the ﬁ  nancial system and require careful monitoring.
In particular, the conviction that interest rates will 
be low for long can lead to various types of risky 
behaviour in the ﬁ  nancial sector. In response to 
low returns on typical ﬁ  nancial instruments, for 
example, ﬁ  nancial institutions and investors more 
broadly are actively seeking riskier investments to 
boost returns. There is strong evidence of this in 
a variety of markets. Sustained behaviour of this 
kind will substantially increase risk proﬁ  les and 
raise vulnerabilities to shocks. Reversals in market 
conditions would lead to large losses on the part 
of investors and institutions, with follow-on effects 
throughout our economies.
The pressures on insurance companies and pension 
funds, with their longer-term guaranteed returns 
or beneﬁ  ts, are especially apparent. By reducing 
yields on assets and raising the net present value 
of liabilities, a sustained period of low interest rates 
makes these guarantees harder to fulﬁ  ll. To address 
potential shortfalls, funds could move into riskier 
assets in a search for yield and/or shorten their 
duration to limit asset-liability mismatches.
In another example, banks have used low short-term 
funding rates to rebuild capital by investing in 
long-term government bonds. This strategy is 
effective to a point, but may diminish the sense of 
urgency with which banks reduce leverage or write 
down bad assets.
Past experience has in fact shown that low policy rates 
facilitate “evergreening,” or the rolling-over of non-viable 
loans. The classic example was Japan in the 1990s 
when banks permitted debtors to roll over loans on 
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6  The record of capital controls is not encouraging, as they are often evaded over time.
which they could afford the near zero interest payments 
but not principal repayments. By evergreening loans 
instead of writing them off, banks preserved their 
capital, but this delayed necessary restructuring in 
the industry. Moreover, the presence of non-viable 
ﬁ  rms limited competition, reduced investment and 
prevented the entry of new enterprises. 
Likewise, household credit tends to expand rapidly in 
the presence of low interest rates. As a consequence, 
the proportion of households with stretched ﬁ  nancial 
positions grows signiﬁ  cantly. Without a signiﬁ  cant 
change in behaviour, the proportion of households 
that would be susceptible to serious ﬁ  nancial stress 
from an adverse shock will continue to increase.
EMERGING ECONOMIES, THE SEARCH FOR YIELD 
AND ASSET PRICE BUBBLES
Persistently low interest rates, and modest economic 
growth in advanced economies, mean that investors 
are turning increasingly to EMEs in their search 
for yield. Capital ﬂ  ows to emerging economies, for 
example, have rebounded sharply in the aftermath of 
the crisis (Chart 7). Combined with accommodative 
monetary policy, these ﬂ  ows have led to concerns 
that asset price bubbles may be emerging in equity 
or property markets (Chart 8). Wary of boom/bust 
cycles, many EMEs are trying to contain these 
pressures by introducing capital controls (perhaps 
under the guise of macroprudential policy) –but in 
essence, such measures only serve to introduce new 
rigidities into the IMS.6 A more durable response 
would be to address the current rigidities in the IMS 
that are contributing to global imbalances.
3| MOVING FORWARD
Experience suggests that prolonged periods of 
unusually low rates can cloud assessments of 
ﬁ  nancial risks, induce a search for yield and delay 
balance-sheet adjustments. There are several 
defences. 
The ﬁ  rst is built on the decisions of individuals, 
companies, banks and governments. Extraordinary 
measures are only a means to an end. Ordinary 
times will eventually return and, with them, more 
normal interest rates and costs of borrowing. It is 
the responsibility of households to ensure that in the 
future, they can service the debts they take on today. 
Similarly, ﬁ  nancial institutions are responsible for 
ensuring that their clients can service their debts. 
More broadly, market participants should resist 
complacency and constantly reassess risks. Low rates 
today do not necessarily mean low rates tomorrow. Risk 
reversals when they happen can be ﬁ  erce: the greater 
the complacency, the more brutal the reckoning.
Chart 7
Total private capital ﬂ  ows to EMEs
(USD billions)
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f: Forecast.
Source: Institute of International Finance.
Chart 8
China: second hand apartment price index
(17 city population-weighted average)
July
2009











Source: Soufun and Bank of Canada calculation.
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The second line of defence is enhanced supervision 
of risk-taking activities. Stress testing in major 
economies should focus on excessive maturity 
and currency mismatches, look for evidence of 
forbearance (such as ailing industries receiving a 
disproportionate share of loans or the loosening of 
standards for existing debtors) and analyse the impact 
of sharp moves in yield curves.
These efforts will be aided by the imposition of the 
new Basel III regulations. Measures, including a 
leverage ratio, new trading book rules and liquidity 
standards, will help curtail excessive leverage and 
maturity transformation. 
The third line of defence is the development and 
selected use of macroprudential measures. In funding 
markets, the introduction of through-the-cycle 
margining can help curtail liquidity cycles. In broader 
asset markets, counter-cyclical capital buffers can 
be deployed to lean against excess credit creation. 
Importantly, following the agreement of G20 leaders in 
Seoul, the Basel Committee endorsed this framework. 
These lines of defence are imperfect responses to 
a difﬁ  cult global environment. The best policy is 
to address the underlying disequilibria. Countries 
need to implement the policy reforms set out by 
the G20 Framework for Strong, Sustainable and 
Balanced Growth, and its Mutual Assessment Process. 
This includes ﬁ  scal consolidation, greater exchange 
rate ﬂ  exibility for EMEs, implementing structural 
reforms to increase growth, and continuing ﬁ  nancial 
sector reform and repair. These measures, combined 
with vigilance on the part of financial sector 
supervisors, and the need for market participants 
not to become complacent, are the best means to 
ensure that the recovery endures. 
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